A serious threat to cognitive radio networks that sense the spectrum in a cooperative manner is the transmission of false spectrum sensing data by malicious sensor nodes. SNR fluctuations due to wireless channel effects complicate handling such attackers even further. This enforces the system to acquire authentication. Actually, the decision maker needs to determine the reliability or trustworthiness of the shared data. In this paper, the evaluation process is considered as an estimation dilemma on a set of evidences obtained through sensor nodes that are coordinated in an underlying wireless sensor network. Then, a likelihood-based computational trust evaluation algorithm is proposed to determine the trustworthiness of each sensor node's data. The proposed procedure just uses the information which is obtained from the sensor nodes without any presumptions about node's reliability. Numerical results confirm the effectiveness of the algorithm in eliminating malicious nodes or faulty nodes which are not necessarily conscious attackers.
Introduction
One of the main limitations in developing next generation networks and new services for the existing networks is bandwidth scarcity. Cognitive radio network is a novel idea that will overcome the spectrum scarcity problem with providing the capability of sharing the wireless channel between unlicensed users (secondary users (SU)) and licensed users (primary users (PU)) in an opportunistic manner. The PUs take precedence of the SUs in spectrum access; a cognitive radio should not communicate on a channel that is being used by a licensed user [1] [2] . This point makes the spectrum sensing process an essential, a process for discovering the spectrum holes or discovering the presence of an active PU in the desired band.
The spectrum sensing procedure can be accomplished individually or in a cooperative manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing itself might be accomplished via either decision fusion or data fusion [3] . In a data fusion scheme, SUs share their primary collected data from RF stimuli in a Fusion Center (FC) which decides the presence or the absence of the PUs in the desired band using the shared information. However, in a decision fusion approach the CR nodes send their decision (that are made individually) to FC for final decision. Match filtering; cyclo-stationary feature detection and energy detection are three well-known methods which are used to sense the CR spectrum [4] . The proposed method in this paper is based on energy detection A. Taherpour et al. [5] proposed an energy-detection based data fusion method and show that in fading channels Equal Gain Combining (EGC) data fusion has near-optimal performance without the requirement of channel gains estimation. According to their method if the measured energies average that is reported by coordinated nodes becomes larger than a specific threshold value the presence of the PU can be assumed to be true, otherwise the absence of the PU becomes true. They have shown that when the SNRs of the SUs are large enough the detector approaches the optimum detector. However, Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) fluctuations due to multipath effects can complicate the spectrum sensing operation. We will show that by employing this method in a wireless channel condition, a poor performance is observed when the SNR at the SU's receivers are not necessarily high. Under such conditions, an accurate knowledge of the sensing statistics is required for collaborated spectrum sensing to form adequate decision statistics [6] . Estimation and deployment of these statistics in a hypothesis test approach are the main focus of this paper. To this end, we consider data fusion scheme as the final rule for incumbent detection.
The requirement to collect the information about energy distribution in the coverage area of the network naturally leads us to resort to an underlying wireless sensor network. The idea of deploying an underlying WSN to facilitate the spectrum sensing operation is utilized in several works such as [7] [8] . S. Shankar et al. [7] propose a spectrum-aware sensor network architecture that can be used in collecting information about the spectrum opportunities throughout a CR network. But they do not propose any data fusion method or decision approach that is based on the collected data. [8] employs the WSN capability in measuring Revived Signal Strength (RSS) to solve the PU transmitter localization problem and developing a method for defense against Primary User Emulator Attackers (PUEA).
Wireless sensor network is one of the most compelling technologies comprising a large number of sensor nodes cooperatively monitor environment or perform surveillance tasks [9, 10] . The architecture we utilized here to address the spectrum sensing issue is based on a sensor networks which is deployed for the spectrum sensing purpose. The network composed of many distributed nodes each of which measure the energy level of the desired band and communicate the measured value to the FC (sink node) for final decision about the occupancy of the desired frequency band. The sensor network can be either a dedicated WSN that is fully employed for spectrum sensing goal or cognitive sensor nodes that opportunistically make use of the spectrum as well as spectrum sensing. In the later case, each CR nodes must be equipped with a sensor module. Regardless of which architecture is deployed we use the term sensor node to refer to the node witch sense the spectrum. Figure 1 depicts a typical network with the model of just mentioned cognitive WSN network architecture.
Beside the wireless channel effect, another source of ambiguity that is of concern in this paper is false spectrum sensing data that might be reported by some malicious nodes. Although so far several methods have been proposed for cooperative sensing and their performance have been studied extensively [3, 11, 12] , most of pre- vious works assume that the sensing nodes are completely reliable, but, what does happen if some of the coordinated nodes report false data intentionally? A serious threat to cognitive radio networks which sense the spectrum in a cooperative manner is the transmission of false spectrum sensing data by malicious secondary nodes. In this case, attacker (attackers) through false data injection in CRN database try to fool CRN and stimulate the CR nodes to use channels occupied by PUs or prevents the SUs from using the empty channels. In the literature, the term spectrum sensing data falsification attack (SSDFA) is used to refer to such an attack [13] [14] [15] .
Due to cooperation and statistical data valuation, the proposed cooperative method is inherently resistant against misinformation but when the number of malicious nodes increases the false reports can degrade the performance. The other source of data falsification is when the sensors do not function properly. Therefore, the data fusion method to be employed in coordinated nodes must be robust against fraudulent local spectrum-sensing output that would be reported by either malicious nodes or faulty nodes. Our proposed method acquires this robustness by developing a soft trust management process among the sensor nodes. To this end, the likelihood of the reported observations are deployed to assign a trust factor to each report; the trust factor of a particular report determine the portion of that reported value on the final decision making in FC. This paper extends our previous work [16] on cooperative spectrum sensing by taking into account the effect of small scale multipath fading on the PU signal which is received at the sensor nodes as well as the effect of presence some SSDF attackers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the system model will be described. The proposed trust evaluation algorithm is introduced in section 3, and the numerical results are depicted in section 4. Section 5 concludes the remarks.
Basic Assumptions and System Model
A cooperative spectrum sensing scheme employing energy detection under fading channel condition is considered as illustrated in Figure 1 . It is assumed that a total number of N sensor node in an underlying WSN are coordinated to detect the spectrum holes of a frequency band which is licensed for primary users of a primary network. The sensor nodes send their collected data to the fusion center for final decision for the absence or the presence of primary users in the desired frequency band [13, 14, 16] .
The channel model between primary base station and sensor nodes is assumed to be Nakagami multipath fading [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . The observation time interval T is small enough to presume that all received signal at energy detectors (CR nodes) experience the same fading condition during the observation. Besides uncertainty of reported energy that is measured by sensor devices due to multipath fading phenomena and/or their malfunctioning behaviour, it must be considered that a group of malicious nodes may try to misinform the FC. This issue is shown in Figure 1 where the attacker nodes with a circle drawn around them are determined. Figure 2 depicts the fusion center block diagram with the following variables: 
where,   n t is an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) with zero mean and variance of 0 2 N ;   s t represents the primary user signal which is influenced by the wireless channel. It is assumed that the sensor nodes sense the spectrum synchronously; thanks to the underlying WSN, the FC will be able to obtain a snapshot of the current state of signal energy distribution in its coverage area through the WSN network. This Synchronization can be obtained easily by a beacon transmission through central node or other well-known methods such as GPS [22] .
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing Algorithm Based on Statistical Data Assessment
In the following, each one of the three components of the proposed method will be described in detail.
Prefiltering
In order to determine the trustworthiness of the sensor node's reports, a trust management process is developed throughout the sensor network. The trust evaluation algorithm is formulated as an estimation problem on a set of evidences 
where,  and  are mean and standard deviation of the set of   i e k s respectively. likely cause the observed data to occur [25] . So, given
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, the ML estimate for  can be determined from the likelihood equation as [25] :
hence,
It is supposed that the sensor nodes are distributed in a large geographical area, so it can be said that the received signal at each sensor experiences identical independent channel condition (i.i.d.) [5] , thus:
Now, using ML estimator (MLE), we will be able to estimate the probability distribution
Butwhat is the pdf type of the observation? Central Chisquare or noncentral Chi-square? In order to give a precise estimation on the parameters, we should know the pdf type of the process which is sampled by sensor nodes. This means, we should know the presence or absence of the PU in the under investigation band. To break the tie, we use an approximation model known as Torrieri model [26] that approximates a chi-square (central or noncentral) as a Gaussian distribution: [26] . Substitution of (7) into (6) and employment of (5), the i e s distribution parameters can be estimated in a straight forward manner. For a normal distribution, as indicated in (8) 
Utilizing (8), we will be able to estimate the unknown parameters introduced in (7). In fact, (7) determines the probability distribution function for received power over the channel and also provides valuable information for FC to determine the expectancy of reported data. This expectancy helps FC to obtain the reliability of the node's reports that can be used to eliminate the malicious users influence on the primary user detection. The proposed algorithm steps for trust factor evaluation are summarized as follows: 
3) Normalized trust factor ' i TF for i th CR user in k th iteration will be as:
It is worth noting that the normalized-computed trust factor in (10) just determines the portion of corresponding nodes in final spectrum decision. One should consider that the trust factor of a node in comparison with trust factor of the other nodes would be a meaningful value. To include the pre-determined 
This means, the trust factor H hypothesis only. Because, in the absence of the legitimate signal the energy detector just measures the noise energy level of the channel thus its distribution depends on the noise model only.
To solve this problem, we rewrite 
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if the PU's signal experiences a Nakagami multipath fading channel with parameter m. In this case, probability density function of instant received power p at energy detector is [17] :
From (13), the probability density function of pT N which determine the degree of freedom and the noncentrality respectively [24] . Therefore:
where r P is the average received power. (15) and (13) [26, 27] . Utilizing (13) and applying the normal approximation, (14) 
In low power detection schemes, i.e. when the SNR at energy detector is small, the signal of ) (t s has a little effect on the variance of the test statistics [26] . So, we can ignore pT N 0 and assume that the variance of the PU signal is 2 0 N TW in either decision cases. Considering these assumptions and performing some mathematical manipulation, (16) will be simplified as:
where, 1 C and 2 C are given by: 
Finally, using the well-known properties of the Gaussian function can be easily shown that: 
where, is the Gaussian Q-function. Equation (19) For a channel model with specific value of the parameter m, (20) should be calculated as a function of   i e k only once and to be used repeatedly. In order to determine (20) for channel models with different values of parameter m, higher order derivatives of the Q function is necessary. It can be easily shown that:
we will be able to determine the likelihood of each prefiltered report   i e k and determine the trust factor following the steps of trust evaluation algorithm that is presented in part 1.
Data Fusion Algorithm
Final decision for the presence or the absence of primary user in desired frequency band is devolved to data fusion block. This block deals with a group of reported energies with their known trust factors that are computed from (11) . Generally speaking, every existing data fusion approach which is modified to include the reliability of each component can be deployed. The simplest one is weighting average combination scheme: e is a function of false alarm probability fa P , and should be evaluated numerically. fa P determines the probability that a free channel (spectrum hole) is imagined occupied wrongly.
Performance Evaluation
Using computer simulation, the performance of the proposed spectrum sensing method is evaluated and is compared with the reference model (EGC) as bearing the following steps:
Simulation Setup
Assume a group of N sensor nodes that are coordinated to sense the spectrum with the model as shown in Figure  1 . The channel model between the CR nodes and the PU's base station is assumed to be Nakagami with 1  m , i.e. a Rayleigh fading channel. Mean received SNR at the CR users considered to be -10 dBm. Observation interval T and channel bandwidth W are chosen such that TW = 100. H and  both are chosen to be 3.
T e is determined numerically such that 0.01 fa P  when no malicious node is present. The conditional probability of (20) P H must be determined. Several methods are proposed for estimating these parameters, one of which is the method that is proposed by H. Kim in [28] . Without loss of generality, for simplicity in the simulation we assumed that     0 1 0.5 P H P H   . To evaluate the performance of the given method, two prevalent parameters fa P (false alarm probability) and d P (detection probability) are considered. fa P determines the ability strength of the applied method for detecting the spectrum holes and has impact on the spectral efficiency of the CRN; but, d P determines the ability strength of the employed method in detecting and avoiding interference with the PUs. If i H shows the decision about channel occupancy at the FC, false alarm and detection probability are defined as:
Simulation Results
To test the power of the proposed method in eliminating the effect of malicious sensor nodes or faulty nodes in the process of decision making about channel occupancy, worst condition is assumed; i.e., when the channel is occupied, malicious nodes report the smallest possible value which can be passed from the pre-filter block, but when the channel is free, malicious nodes report largest possible value which can be passed from the pre-filter. The false alarm probability of the proposed method for N = 50, N = 100, N = 200, N = 200 and N = 300 are depicted in Figure 3 and is compared with EGC method [5] . As can be seen from Figure 3 , the proposed trust algorithm works quite well in the presence of noticeable percentage of malicious nodes. The effect of malicious nodes, up to 18% of total nodes, is eliminated completely; Whereas, in similar conditions and for the same malicious nodes number, false alarm probability corresponding to EGC method is bigger than 0.97. Figure 4 shows the detection probability of the proposed method in comparison with EGC. When the malicious node percent increase to 22%, the performance of simple averaging and our trust algorithm becomes similar. However, the performance of simple averaging decreases drastically for higher percentages of malicious nodes. When 30% of cooperating nodes are malicious, the detection probability of simple averaging is decreased to 0.5, whereas, the detection probability of proposed trust algorithm is bigger than 0.97.
However, the performance of simple averaging decreases drastically for higher percentages of malicious nodes. When 30% of cooperating nodes are malicious, the detection probability of simple averaging is decreased to 0.5, whereas, the detection probability of pro posed trust algorithm is bigger than 0.97.
The effect of H and  parameters, defined in section 3.2, on d P are illustrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively. These parameters determine the portion of the previous judgments on current evaluation. Simulation results show that, this inclusion can improve the elimination of malicious nodes effect, and whatever the inclusion of the pre-determined values increase, the performance increases too. Also, the effect of H and  parameters on fa P are depicted in Figure 7 and Figure 8 respectively. The total number of sensor nodes, N, are assumed to be 300. 
Conclusion
A computational trust evaluation algorithm was proposed to overcome malicious nodes trying to misinform CRN or the false data that might be reported by faulty nodes in a cooperative spectrum sensing process. The evaluation process is considered as an estimation dilemma on a set of evidences obtained from an underlying wireless sensor network. The network composed of many distributed nodes each of which measure the energy level of the desired band and communicate the measured value to the sink node for final decision about the occupancy of the desired frequency band. The sensor network can be either a dedicated WSN that is fully employed for spectrum sensing goal or cognitive sensor nodes that opportunistically make use of the spectrum as well as spectrum sensing. Utilizing the collected data and deploying the well-known characteristic of signals in wireless environment, a mechanism for secure spectrum sensing was developed. The sink node (fusion center) is laid out in a centralized manner and employs a likelihood-based trust evaluating algorithm to determine the reliability of all measured data. Utilizing the assigned trust factors, a simple combination scheme is employed to make a final decision for the presence or the absence of primary user in desired frequency band. Simulation results, in the worst condition, confirm the effectiveness of the algorithm in eliminating malicious or malfunctioning nodes effects.
